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Newsletter Spring 2018 
 Volume 3, Issue 2 
 
Message from the Chair 
 
Dear IHAP Members 
 
This excellent newsletter considers the challenge adapting standard IR 
theory to understand questions of import in other parts of the world.  
Together the contributions consider whether our discipline should be 
moving to less American and European IR perspectives—an apt question 
to ask right before the truly international ISA conference.  
 
The contributions raise many good points, and after all who can defend 
insisting on the relevance of theories that are not helpful in understanding 
politics in other parts of the world? To play the devil’s advocate, however, 
let me raise a concern. In IR, theory is primarily a heuristic used to generate 
expectations (or serve as a foil). We may as well expand the heuristic 
toolkit so as to better capture reality, but there is also a need to keep toolkit 
limited. I teach on the quarter system, which means we have 9 weeks for a 
graduate IR theory course. Since we want to also cover subjects, and not 
just cannons, we don’t want 9 weeks of different theories. Nor do our 
graduate students want to double the potential explanations they need to 
investigate.   
 
If expanding theories increases explanatory power, then there is little to 
lose in expanding our toolkit. But the challenge then becomes how to 
consolidate criticisms of American or Euro-centric approaches into one or 
maybe two new paradigms?  Moreover, if the goal is to internationalize IR, 
these also need to be fairly simple paradigms that students around the 
world (e.g. non-native English speakers) can grasp on to. 
 
In the other area I research—International Law—the challenge is of a 
different nature. Anthea Roberts’s new book, Is International Law 
International?, considers how the “universalist” subject of international 
law is taught in different parts of the world, as well as the different careers 
of international legal academics around the world. Roberts—who has 
taught international law in the US, UK and Australia—collected syllabi, 
textbooks and CVs from different parts of the world, and she conducted 
interviews with leading international law faculty from the countries of 
focus. She found that legal ideas and the foundation international legal 
concepts are actually explained differently, and different topics are given 
different levels of emphasis. These differences increase the likelihood of 
conflict because legal advisors in different parts of the world understand 
their legal obligations differently. To be sure, some interpretations and  
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teachings may be self-serving. One might expect, for example, that Chinese scholars are taught an international 
law that validates China’s claim to the South China Seas, and invalidates the arbitral ruling that says otherwise. 
Yet, Roberts study suggests that an entire profession inside of China—lawyers, judges and academics—can 
come to see international law very differently from their European and American counterparts. The resentment 
which might then arise when lawyers “explain” to each other why the other’s argument is wrong will not help 
to alleviate differences. The China situation is only somewhat different than what Lauri Mäilksoo describes 
when he considers Russia’s arguments about the “illegal” sanctions being applied in light of its annexation of 
the Crimea. In short, there may not be any common set of “legal facts” or transnationally shared legal 
understandings. 
 
If IR theory were understood differently in different parts of the world, the result may not be conflict. Rather, 
we may find that scholars from outside of the US and European orbit might have a difficult time publishing in 
the field’s top journals, because reviewers may believe that non-Western scholars simply misunderstand IR 
theory. This raises the question of whether IR needs a book that asks Is International Relations Theory 
International? Or, maybe we don’t need new paradigms as much as we need a map to what realism, 
constructivism, liberalism, practice theory etc. look like to scholars in different parts of the world? 
 
This newsletter also contains thoughtful interviews with the winners of our section’s book and article prizes. 
The authors are asked to offer tips to young scholars, to explain how they work historical insights and 
approaches into their work, and how their historically oriented work differs from that of historians. 
 
Thanks to Peter and Tom for another excellent newsletter. I should note that this newsletter is a little less 
international than they had hoped; the lecturer strike in the UK has affected its content.  
 
Happy Spring to all.  One last thing—if you are interested in becoming more active in IHAP, we will be looking 
for new members of our executive committee.  Please let me know if you are interested. 
 
Karen J. Alter 
Professor of Political Science and Law, Northwestern University 
 
 
 
 
Board Members:  
Keith Darden, American University 
Victoria Tin-bor Hui, University of Notre Dame 
Elizabeth Kier, University of Washington 
Tanisha Fazal, University of Notre Dame 
Stacie Goddard, Wellesley College 
Miles Kahler, American University 
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Roundtable 
IR Theory across Space and Time 
 
Introduction: IR Theory across Space and Time 
By Peter Harris, Colorado State University, 
Tom Le, Pomona College, 
Hyeyoon Park, Colorado State University, and 
Erika Sato, Pomona College 
 
There is some irony in the fact that International 
Relations—the only academic discipline devoted in 
its entirety to the study of global interactions—should 
be so narrowly constituted in terms of its geography. 
Overwhelmingly, the ranks of IR scholars are drawn 
from white-majority Anglophone countries, with 
voices from the Global South being underrepresented 
in the discipline’s prominent journals as well as in 
most conventional accounts of its intellectual history. 
 
One consequence of IR’s heavy skew in favor of 
white Anglophone authors is that the field has tended 
to rely on empirical evidence derived from the 
international histories of Europe and, to a somewhat 
lesser extent, North America when building and 
testing its vast corpus of analytical concepts and 
explanatory theories. In this roundtable, four 
contributors discuss whether this traditional empirical 
focus on the North Atlantic region has saddled the 
discipline of IR with a set of theoretical paradigms 
that are pathologically limited in their usefulness. 
What are the challenges and opportunities that arise 
when scholars generate a theory of international 
politics with reference to one region or time period 
and then to apply that theory to other regions or eras? 
Can IR theories be truly generalizable, or is their 
scope always bound by space and time? What are the 
general implications of “Eurocentrism” for IR 
scholarship? 
 
Kick-starting the discussion, Pinar Bilgin (“Why 
Globalise International Relations?”) suggests that, 
indeed, IR theory suffers from a marked Eurocentric 
bias. Bilgin explains that, inside the Western core of 
IR, the project of “globalizing” IR is often portrayed 
as the antidote to this problem of Eurocentrism. From 
this view, IR would be “fixed” if it could incorporate 
the theoretical innovations of scholars from a greater 
variety of cultures and countries. But Bilgin contends 
that globalizing IR will take more than just pluralism: 
it will also require scholars of IR to examine how the 
existing canon of IR-theoretical knowledge has 
already been influenced by non-Western voices, often 
in highly significant yet overlooked or (willfully) 
forgotten ways. 
 
Next, May Darwich (“Analytical Eclecticism: 
Appraising the Study of Middle East International 
Relations”) examines the capacity of IR theories for 
shedding light on the contemporary international 
politics of the Middle East. Drawing on Rudra Sil and 
Peter Katzenstein’s work on “analytical eclecticism” 
in International Relations, Darwich contends that an 
eclectic approach to studying the Middle East can 
help push scholars in the direction of more problem-
driven (instead of paradigm-driven) research. At the 
same time, she argues, “eclecticism as an emerging 
IR approach can benefit from the richness and 
complexity of cases in the Middle East to develop 
further connections and links among different 
theoretical traditions.” 
 
Graham Odell (“Mechanisms, Episodes and IR 
Theory”) provides a direct answer to the question of 
whether IR theories can profitably be applied to 
empirical cases that span space and time. His 
injunction is for scholars to use theories as tools to 
explain discrete “mechanisms” and “episodes” rather 
than aggregated historical processes. While politics 
across space and time might vary considerably, Odell 
acknowledges, scholars need not entirely forsake the 
goal of producing generalizable knowledge about 
what drives political interactions. 
 
Finally, David Kang (“The Challenge of East Asia for 
International Relations Theories”) offers a focused 
analysis of one Western-generated IR theory (power-
transition theory) and its applicability to one non-
Western region (East Asia). Overall, Kang cautions 
that power-transition theory makes little sense when 
applied to historical East Asia. Different types of 
political regimes and, crucially, East Asia’s distinct 
international-systemic context meant that the region 
simply experienced the rise and fall of great powers 
in a way unlike Europe. “Perhaps more of our theories 
are more specific and contingent than is commonly 
believed,” Kang concludes, meaning that “carefully 
identifying those scope and boundary conditions will 
be critical moving forward.”  
 
In many ways, International Relations as a discipline 
is undergoing an experience that parallels events in 
the real world: just as “globalization” as a project of 
social, political, and economic homogenization is 
being met with local resistance around the world, so 
too is the idea of a “one-size-fits-all” International 
Relations coming under increasing strain. Old truisms 
about the veracity and universal applicability of 
traditional IR theories no longer seem secure. And 
even if the response need not be anything as extreme 
as the fragmentation of IR into multiple country- or 
region-specific IRs, careful reflection about local 
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circumstances, knowledge, and historical 
geographies is likely to reveal that IR still has a lot to 
incorporate. The discipline will be the better for it. 
 
 
 
 
 
Why Globalise International Relations? 
By Pinar Bilgin, Bilkent University 
 
Is not the study of international relations (IR) already 
global? After all, academic departments at 
universities around the world are devoted to the study 
of world politics; annual meetings of the International 
Studies Association consistently attract 5000 or more 
researchers from all around the globe; and regional IR 
conferences convene regularly in myriad locales. In 
terms of its reach, International Relations as an 
academic discipline is already global. 
 
Over the years, sociological analyses have shown that 
IR is studied differently in different parts of the 
world. Yet, the point of globalising International 
Relations is not only to inquire into the different ways 
that world politics is studied and understood in the 
global South; but also to interrogate critically the way 
IR is studied inside the global North. While IR as a 
field of study may be global in terms of its reach, the 
same cannot be said for its substance.  
 
That said, not everybody is convinced of the need to 
globalise IR. After all, some sceptics say, IR produces 
universally applicable ‘objective’ knowledge about 
world politics by virtue of being a ‘scientific’ product. 
Global variations in the study and teaching of IR, they 
suggest, are a result of less-than-proper training in 
scientific methods. While IR may have originated in 
Western Europe and North America, they insist, this 
is only an accident of history and therefore not 
consequential for the production of knowledge about 
world politics. Accordingly, some sceptics conclude, 
                                                 
1 E.H. Carr quoted in Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 
“The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” Review 
of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2006): 329-352, at 349. 
2 Kalevi J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony 
and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen & 
Unwin, 1985), 118. 
3 Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not So International 
Discipline: American and European Developments in 
there is no need to globalise IR, for it is already 
global—not only in terms of its reach but also by 
virtue of producing universally applicable ‘scientific’ 
knowledge about world politics. 
 
 
 
However, IR’s origins in the US and Western Europe 
is not inconsequential for what we know about world 
politics. Accordingly, considering the implications of 
such locatedness and seeking to address the 
limitations that follow is no mere subject of academic 
curiosity. This is a point raised earlier by E.H. Carr 
who noted that the study of world politics had, for 
long, reflected the perspectives and concerns of the 
‘mighty’. The state of IR at the time was not 
sustainable, argued Carr. He expected the less 
powerful to begin to make their voices heard in world 
politics as well as its scholarly study.1 In the early 
1980s, K.J. Holsti echoed Carr when he invited 
students of IR to take stock of the field and see ‘who 
does the theorising?’ [original emphasis], for he 
expected the findings to have significant implications 
for the study of world politics. This was because, 
Holsti wrote, IR ‘reflected the historical experience of 
the European state system in the past, and the Cold 
War more recently’ and that one should expect 
‘serious challenges’ to come from those who did not 
share these experiences or experienced them 
differently. ‘The problem of what kind of theories we 
use to understand and explain the world of 
international politics is not divorced from who does 
the theorising’, he concluded.2 
 
To recap, there are two related dynamics behind the 
calls for globalising IR. First, sociological analyses of 
the field of IR revealed it to be ‘not so international’.3 
That is to say, there are relatively few global South 
contributors to IR publications. Second, IR’s 
understanding of ‘the international’ is less-than-
sociological.4 The point being that existing body of 
studies do not reflect interactions between the global 
North and the global South in the constitution of the 
realm called the ‘international’. Prevalent 
conceptions of the international have come to prevail 
by overlooking the experiences, contributions and 
contestations of peoples and states from the global 
International Relations,” International Organization 52, 
no. 4 (1998): 687-727. 
4 Stephen Chan, “Cultural and Linguistic Reductionisms 
and a New Historical Sociology for International 
Relation,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 
22, no. 3 (1993): 423-442; and Justin Rosenberg, “Why Is 
There No International Historical Sociology?” European 
Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 307-
340. 
“Not everybody is convinced of 
the need to globalise IR.”  
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South.  Hence the concept used in reference to the 
latter: ‘constitutive outside’.5 
 
‘Constitutive outside’ refers to the ideas and 
experiences of those people and states in the global 
South who have shaped the global North even as the 
latter are not always aware of and/or acknowledge 
what they owe the latter.6 This is often due to the 
prevalence of Eurocentric narratives on world history 
that do not always reflect the contributions and 
contestations of the global South.7 Accordingly, the 
concept of constitutive outside highlights a 
contradiction that is central to thinking about the 
relationship between the global South and the global 
North. That said, this is not a contradiction to be 
resolved, but only acknowledged and thought 
through. For, the global South’s ideas and 
experiences have shaped world politics and yet these 
contributions and contestations have not been 
acknowledged explicitly in scholarly studies on the 
international. What is absent, in other words, is not 
contributions from the global South per se, but their 
due recognition in scholarly studies on world politics. 
 
Consider, for example, Siba Grovogui’s archival 
study on the contributions of African intellectuals to 
European debates on the post-World War II order in 
Europe.8 While these intellectuals’ contributions and 
contestations shaped debates during World War II, 
Grovogui showed, their contributions were not 
always acknowledged when the intellectual history of 
this period was written. Nor was their advice 
regarding the post-war order given due value, noted 
Grovogui. Once the war was concluded in a way that 
was favourable to the allies, the camaraderie between 
European and African intellectuals that was formed 
during the war came to an abrupt end. The point being 
that understanding the global South as ‘constitutive 
outside’ of the global North is not a contradiction to 
be resolved, but only acknowledged and thought 
through as regards their implications for the study of 
world politics. Those who are ‘outside’ are outside 
not always because they are physically far away (i.e. 
in the global South) but because they have been left 
outside of conventional narratives on world history 
due to the prevalence of Eurocentrism in history 
writing.9  
 
Following Blaney and Inayatullah, I suggest that our 
strategy for globalising IR should be one of 
‘excavation’ and not one of adding another body of 
theory.10 As well as asking ‘Why is there no non-
Western IR Theory?’,11 we could also ask, as Arif 
Dirlik did: why is it that we search for the kind of IR 
theory that ‘we’ are accustomed to when we look at 
other parts of the world.12 Such a question would then 
highlight how our inquiries into IR scholarship 
around the world are conditioned by pre-existing 
definitions as to what counts as IR ‘theory’. The point 
being, identifying the issue as one of ‘absence’ of IR 
theory outside the US and Western Europe identifies 
the problem in self-centred terms by formulating the 
problem in terms of others not doing things 
(theorizing) in the way that ‘we’ are accustomed to. 
As captured by the notion of ‘constitutive outside’, 
what is ‘absent’ may not be theorizing per se, but due 
recognition and acknowledgement of the ways in 
which others’ ideas and writings have already shaped 
‘our’ thinking about the international. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, “International 
Relations from Below, ” in Christian Reus-Smit and 
Duncan Snidal, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) 
6 Stuart Hall, “When Was ‘the Post-Colonial’? Thinking 
at the Limit,” in Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, eds., The 
Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided 
Horizons (London: Routledge, 1996). 
7 Pinar Bilgin, “Beyond the 'Billiard Ball' Model of the 
International,” European Political Science 15, no. 1 
(2016): 117-119. 
8 Siba N. Grovogui, Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: 
Memories of International Order and Institutions (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 
 
 
 
9 Bilgin, “Beyond the 'Billiard Ball' Model of the 
International.” 
10 Blaney and Inayatullah, “International Relations from 
Below.” 
11 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No 
Non-Western International Relations Theory? An 
Introduction.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 
7, no. 3 (2007): 287-312. 
12 Arif Dirlik, “Culture in Contemporary IR Theory: The 
Chinese Provocation,” in Robbie Shilliam, ed., 
International Relations and Non-Western Thought: 
Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global 
Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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Analytical Eclecticism: Appraising the Study 
of Middle East International Relations 
By May Darwich, Durham University 
 
In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, scholars of 
Political Science, in general, were impelled to rethink 
their theoretical tools and concepts in the study of the 
region. As IR scholars of the Middle East pursued the 
same endeavour, they found themselves in the same 
old debate of whether the Middle East is a region 
where normal rules of IR theory applies.1 IR scholars 
with a particular interest in the Middle East have 
constantly found themselves torn between two 
clusters: International Relations (IR) literature with 
little interest in empirical evidence from the region 
and regional analyses with little interest in theories. 
Revealing a lack of cross-fertilization between IR 
theories and region-focused analyses for decades, 
some scholars — such as Mark Tessler, 2  Morten 
Valbjørn,3  and Andrea Teti4  — have called for an 
academic enquiry that moves beyond the “Area 
Studies Controversy” and that is in favour of a 
dialogue between IR Theory and Middle Eastern 
Studies.  
 
This inauspicious start notwithstanding, gradually 
more sophisticated enquiries of international relations 
of the region emerged. A current review of recent 
scholarship on the international relations of the 
Middle East suggests that a different direction is 
being taken and that both fields are gradually engaged 
in serious interchanges. Middle East scholars, in 
particular, have been more keen to engage with IR 
theoretical approaches. In their endeavor to combine 
IR theory and empirical puzzles without discounting 
regional complexities and particularities, many 
                                                 
1 Morten Valbjørn, “Strategies for Reviving the 
International Relations/Middle East Nexus after the Arab 
Uprisings,” PS: Political Science & Politics 50, no. 03 
(July 2017): 647–651. 
2 Mark Tessler, Jodi Nachtwey, and Anna Banda, Area 
Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding 
Middle East Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1999). 
3 Morten Valbjørn, “The Meeting of the Twain: Bridging 
the Gap between International Relations and Middle East 
Studies,” Cooperation and Conflict 38, no. 2 (2003): 163–
173. 
4 Andrea Teti, “Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies 
and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area Studies 
Controversy,” European Journal of International 
Relations 13, no. 1 (March 2007): 117–145. 
5 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Toward a Historical Sociology 
of State Formation in the Middle East,” Middle East 
Critique 19, no. 3 (2010): 201–216. 
scholars have opted for a modified IR Theory applied 
to the Middle East. This adaptation has followed 
several strategies. Some scholars have contextualized 
sociological IR approaches — such as Historical 
Sociology 5  and the English School 6  —  to fit the 
alleged exceptional characteristics of the Middle East. 
Most scholars have, however, developed eclectic 
theoretical frameworks that combine insights from 
several traditional paradigms to capture the 
complexity of regional politics. 7  This eclecticism 
does not neglect assumptions within paradigmatic 
traditions but rather engages with them in pursuit of 
empirical and conceptual connections to account for 
the complexity of international life in the region that 
no single research tradition can. In the remainder of 
this piece, I examine the nature of eclectic scholarship 
on Middle East international relations while linking it 
to similar trends within IR. I also expound on what 
the use of eclecticism in the region may reveal about 
the strengths and weaknesses of this approach and its 
utility in comprehending Middle East International 
Relations. 
 
Eclecticism is considered as any approach that moves 
between and beyond research traditions to explain 
real-world puzzles. Katzenstein and Sil 8  define 
analytical eclecticism as “any approach that seeks to 
extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic 
elements — concepts, logics, mechanisms, and 
interpretations — of theories or narratives that have 
been developed within separate paradigms but that 
address related aspects of substantive problems that 
have both scholarly and practical significance”. 
Whereas eclecticism has been adopted — sometimes 
self-consciously but most of the time unconsciously 
— in the study of the Middle East for decades, IR 
scholars have only recently started to consider 
eclectic frameworks as a serious research approach.9  
6 Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., 
International Society and the Middle East: English School 
Theory at the Regional Level (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
7 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the 
Middle East 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2015); F. Gregory Gause, “Balancing What? Threat 
Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf,” Security 
Studies 13, no. 2 (2003): 273–305. 
8 Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: 
Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (New 
York: Palgrave, 2010), 10. 
9 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asia-
Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytic Eclecticism,” 
International Security 26, no. 3 (2001): 153–185; Rudra 
Sil, “The Foundations of Eclecticism: The 
Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure 
in Social Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 12, no. 
3 (2000): 353–387; Samuel Makinda, “International 
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In a region with an extremely high level of 
militarization, neorealist scholars considered the 
Middle East a typical example where anarchy and 
insecurity are predominant. Constructivists also 
found in the incongruence between the norms of 
sovereignty and identity a puzzle to illustrate the 
validity of their worldview. Within IR debates, 
scholars often outline the three mainstream 
approaches (realism, constructivism, and liberalism) 
or their variants and then show that one of these 
approaches is right and the other two are wrong. 
Some scholars argue that none of these work and opt 
instead for a new theory or theoretical framework.10 
Scholars of the Middle East have approached these 
debates from a different perspective. Instead of 
uncovering the “absolute truth” or developing 
“universal theories”, they are concerned with solving 
empirical questions and unravel puzzles with 
substantive significance for understanding the region.  
 
In this endeavor, scholars of the Middle East have 
often faced with complex phenomena where material 
structure are as important as normative ones. 
Henceforth, ME scholars have relied on eclectic 
frameworks that combine concepts and elements 
from realism and constructivism. Gause, for example, 
offers a theoretical framework based on combining 
several material and ideational elements: the anarchic 
structure, the distribution of power, state-society 
relations, and the region’s economic integration. 11 
Elsewhere, he argues that an understanding of threat 
perception in the Middle East combines neorealism, 
constructivism, as well as domestic politics.12 Along 
the same lines, Hinnebusch 13  offers a theoretical 
framework to explain political outcomes in the IR of 
the region based on combining concepts from 
neorealism, constructivism, and a variant of Marxist 
structuralism.14 
                                                 
Society and Eclecticism in International Relations 
Theory,” Conflict and Cooperation 35, no. 2 (2000): 205–
216. 
10 Katzenstein and Sil, “Eclectic Theorizing in the Study 
and Practice of International Relations,” in Christian 
Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 110. 
11 Gause, “Systemic Approaches to Middle East 
International Relations,” International Studies Review 1, 
no. 1 (1999): 11–31. 
12 Gause, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and 
Alliance Choice in the Gulf.” 
13 Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle 
East. 
14 For other examples of eclecticism, see Bassel Salloukh, 
“Regime Autonomy and Regional Foreign Policy Choices 
in the Middle East: A Theoretical Explanation,” in Rex 
Brynen and Bassel Salloukh, eds., Persistent 
This eclectic standpoint in approaching the 
international relations of the Middle East has 
produced problem-driven rather than paradigm-
driven research. Despite the numerous benefits from 
such approach, it entailed costs for the IR-Area Study 
dialogue. The most common result is that the recent 
dialogue between IR and the Middle East has been 
unidimensional where the interchange was limited to 
theory testing, application, and adaptation to produce 
sophisticated and complex analyses of various 
regional phenomena. Yet, the Middle East remains 
largely invisible in IR theory development, and 
theoretical debates have hardly engaged with 
empirical evidence from the region. 15  The Middle 
East remains missing from major IR textbooks 
compared to other regions in the world system. In 
addition, the Middle East is surprisingly missing from 
the emerging literature on eclecticism in IR.16 
 
Furthermore, even though recent scholarship on the 
international relations of the Middle East reveals that 
research in the area is characterised by serious 
interchanges with universal theoretical approaches 
from IR Theory, the scholarship has lacked a sense of 
progress in understanding the Middle East; in the 
Permeability?: Regionalism, Localism and Globalization  
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 81–104; Fred Lawson, 
Constructing International Relations in the Arab World 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); May 
Darwich, “Ideational and Material Forces in Threat 
Perception: The Divergent Cases of Syria and Saudi 
Arabia During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988),” Journal 
of Global Security Studies 1, no. 2 (2016): 142–156. 
15 Two books are unique in this aspect: Stephen Walt, The 
Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987); Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: 
Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998). 
16 Despite the rich, eclectic tradition in Middle East 
International Relations, not a single example from the 
region has been cited in Sil and Katzenstein, Beyond 
Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World 
Politics. 
“Eclecticism does not neglect 
assumptions within paradigmatic 
traditions but rather engages with 
them in pursuit of empirical and 
conceptual connections to account 
for the complexity of international 
life in the region that no single 
research tradition can.” 
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sense that it is not providing cumulative knowledge 
about unexplained phenomena. The attempts to 
combine theory with empirical evidence are often 
random, unsystematic, and lacking methodological 
reflections. In other words, the eclectic attempts are 
often driven by intuition rather than building on 
previous knowledge to make the field better. 
 
Therefore, the emergence of ‘analytical eclecticism' 
within IR debates bears many potentials for studying 
the Middle East and other regions of the Global 
South. On the one hand, the theoretical development 
of ‘analytical eclecticism' can provide Middle East 
scholars with an invaluable toolkit to capitalize on 
emerging connections between IR paradigms. 
Furthermore, a self-conscious eclectic approach to the 
Middle East will enhance the visibility of the region 
in the IR literature. As analytical eclecticism can 
provide an umbrella for intriguing analyses of the 
Middle East, eclecticism as an emerging IR approach 
can benefit from the richness and complexity of cases 
in the Middle East to develop further connections and 
links among different theoretical traditions. 
 
 
 
 
Mechanisms, Episodes and IR Theory 
By Graham F. Odell, Chapman University 
 
Whether Western-derived IR theory is applicable to 
other world regions is a core debate in IR scholarship. 
For instance, there has 
been considerable 
disagreement on the 
validity of using such 
paradigms as realism 
and liberal-
institutionalism to 
explain East Asian 
international relations. 
This debate often 
treats these paradigms as whole entities in 
competition with each other, with their truth claims 
wholly applicable or not at all. Scholars disagree, for 
instance, on whether balancing theory explains East 
Asian IR. A related debate deals with whether 
regional dynamics are best viewed through a 
Westphalian or hierarchical lens. If paradigms and 
their associated theories are left as whole entities 
comprised of general claims, then this debate may be 
left unresolved. However, I argue that theories can be 
most relevant to formulating explanations for diverse 
contexts through their disaggregation into 
mechanisms. Such disaggregation enables analysts of 
specific empirical cases to construct explanations that 
do not contort social reality into preconceived 
theoretical lenses while still recognizing the potential 
for at least some degree of generalization. 
 
This approach takes inspiration from Sil and 
Katzenstein’s advocacy for analytic eclecticism1, but 
                                                 
1 Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Analytic 
Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring 
Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” 
Perspectives on Politics 8 no. 2 (2010): 411-431. 
most directly draws from McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly’s work on mechanisms and episodes. The latter 
trio of scholars argues in favor of “shifting the search 
away from general models that purport to summarize 
whole categories…and toward the analysis of 
smaller-scale causal mechanisms that recur in 
different combinations with different aggregate 
consequences in varying 
historical settings.” 2 
McAdam et al. structure 
their approach around a 
number of concepts, 
though I focus on their 
definitions of mechanisms 
and episodes. Episodes are 
specific instances of some 
concept that the analyst 
wants to explain or 
understand. Mechanisms, in turn, are “a delimited 
class of events that alter relations among specified 
sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways 
over a variety of situations.”3 The identification of a 
single mechanism is not enough to explain a 
particular episode. But wherever the mechanism is 
operational, a clear pattern should emerge concerning 
the immediate consequences for relations between 
phenomena. Any given episode can potentially be 
explained by the identification of several mechanisms 
operating in conjunction and/or in series. McAdam et 
al. emphasize formulating explanations for specific 
episodes, treating “recurrent uniformities” with 
skepticism.4 In other words, their purpose is not to 
develop general theories, but instead to account for 
variations across specified historical instances of their 
social phenomenon of interest. 
 
This emphasis on mechanisms and episodes, rather 
than general theory, points a way forward for 
2 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, 
Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 74. 
3 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics, 24. 
4 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics, 29. 
“This emphasis on mechanisms 
and episodes, rather than general 
theory, points a way forward for 
transcending disagreements over 
the (in)applicability of IR theory to 
non-Western regions.” 
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transcending disagreements over the (in)applicability 
of IR theory to non-Western regions, a goal shared by 
other scholars. 5  In other words, a mechanistic-
episodic approach encourages the analyst to 
systematically compare phenomena across diverse 
contexts, without being hamstrung by the need to 
develop a parsimonious, general theory. In the 
remainder of this essay, I use this approach to discuss 
aspects of the Sengoku Period of Japan (1477-1615), 
specifically the developments that occurred between 
1550 and 1590. This era of Japanese history is 
especially appropriate for a discussion of the 
(in)applicability of Western-inspired IR theory 
because of its peculiar dynamics. Unlike the anarchic, 
competitive state system of early and late modern 
Europe that has served as the backdrop for both realist 
and liberal-institutionalist theories, Sengoku Japan 
was an anarchic, institutionally-unstable subsystem 
embedded within a regional hierarchy dominated by 
China. This two-level structure of international 
relations, coupled with the persistence of the Japanese 
emperor as a symbol of (idealized) political unity, 
renders this context distinctive from standard IR 
systems. Another special feature is that the era 
concluded with fundamental system change, as a 
hegemon emerged who was capable of reuniting 
Japan under a single authority structure. All of these 
notable differences suggest that it should be difficult 
to employ standard IR theories to explain the era’s 
dynamics. On balance, I argue that this is the case, 
though key mechanisms of many IR theories can in 
fact be observed in the processes that defined and 
shaped the interactions between actors. Below, I 
discuss the applicability of three mechanisms drawn 
from IR theories in explaining two Sengoku-era 
episodes organized around the careers of two 
prominent samurai warlords – Oda Nobunaga and 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, respectively. Thus, I employ 
this era to illustrate the utility of the mechanistic-
episodic approach in explaining IR system dynamics. 
 
Balancing, a core mechanism of neorealist IR theory,6 
was a common feature of interunit dynamics 
throughout Oda Nobunaga’s career. During the onset 
of his rise to power in the 1550s and 1560s, for 
instance, balancing heavily structured interactions 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic 
Eclecticism.” 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).  
7 Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge: Council on East 
Asian Studies Harvard University, 1982), 36. 
8 Berry, Hideyoshi, 38-51. 
9 Berry, Hideyoshi, 42. 
between major samurai families that dominated the 
region just east of the capital of Kyoto, where the Oda 
clan got its start.7 These families not only engaged in 
external balancing by forming shifting alliances to 
counter the rising strength of any one that became too 
powerful, but also pursued internal balancing through 
encouraging economic development and 
strengthening political control over their territories. 
Though he eliminated one of his neighboring rivals 
(thus ending this local-area balancing system), 
Nobunaga was confronted with balancing by new 
foes as he extended his activities into new regions 
from 1564 through the 1570s. 8  Indeed, his 
assassination in 1582 may very well have been an 
effort to retaliate against his self-aggrandizement.9 
Thus, balancing was a prominent mechanism 
throughout the episode of Nobunaga’s rise and fall. 
 
However, other mechanisms also played a role in the 
dynamics of the Nobunaga era. In fact, Nobunaga 
himself engaged in strategies that challenge the 
expectations of balancing. Though his interactions 
with other samurai warlords were often structured by 
this mechanism, his confrontation with the militant 
Buddhist temple on Mt. Hiei was an instance of 
domination. 10  He launched a war of complete 
destruction against the temple, razing it to the ground 
in 1571. 11  Other powers did not balance against 
Nobunaga in response to this particular campaign of 
his, suggesting that this mechanism operated within 
certain bounds. Indeed, Tsang argues that the 
political-conceptual frameworks of the Buddhist 
sects and the samurai warlords were irreconcilable.12 
Balancing was thus an option for warlords competing 
against other samurai, but not against other types of 
organizations. 
 
Our second episode, Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s rise to 
hegemony from 1582 to 1590, shows that balancing 
in Sengoku Japan was temporally bounded as well. 
The weakened salience of this mechanism is clear as 
Hideyoshi, a former Oda vassal, encountered much 
more limited balancing than did his predecessor. 
Hideyoshi did launch a series of large-scale military 
campaigns across the country, but each was directed 
at a specific front and did not receive a balancing 
10 Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in 
Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
11 Berry, Hideyoshi, 46. 
12 Carol Richmond Tsang, “‘Advance and Be Reborn in 
Paradise...’: Religious Opposition to Political 
Consolidation in Sixteenth-Century Japan,” in John A. 
Ferejohn and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, eds., War and 
State Building in Medieval Japan (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010): 91-109. 
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response from powerful elites ensconced in adjacent 
regions. All but one of his foes accepted terms of 
defeat that guaranteed their survival but also their 
removal from their established bases of support. 
Moreover, these subdued samurai warlords carried 
out Hideyoshi’s hubristic invasion of Korea in the 
1590s despite their strong reluctance to do so.13 Their 
behavior, in other words, was in many ways the 
opposite of balancing. 
 
Rhetorical action, a mechanism drawn from 
Schimmelfenig’s work on EU expansion,14  can be 
used to explain the diminished importance of 
balancing in this second episode. Rhetorical action, 
briefly, is a mechanism that involves the utilization of 
symbolic resources to garner support for public 
efforts. I argue that rhetorical action was a mechanism 
that Hideyoshi employed to weaken resistance to his 
expansionism and consequently undermine the 
balancing mechanism that afflicted Nobunaga’s 
campaigns. In Sengoku Japan, the emperor served as 
a normative symbol that actors could utilize to 
legitimize their self-interested efforts. The samurai 
class in particular continued to recognize the 
normative relevance of the emperor and his 
representation of Japanese unity despite the country’s 
long-running fragmentation. 15  Thus, Hideyoshi’s 
active and continual use of imperial symbolism 
(including an elaborate system of court ranks and 
titles) can be described as an instance of rhetorical 
action that diminished the salience of balancing and, 
consequently, enabled a transformation from 
competitive anarchy to consolidated hierarchy. 
 
For both episodes of late Sengoku history 
(Nobunaga’s rise and Hideyoshi’s ascension), 
warfare was a regular and essential feature. Yet, 
balancing only played a major role in the first, while 
rhetorical action played a core role in the second. 
Thus, two mechanisms that have been derived from 
the European experience can be usefully employed to 
address non-Western system dynamics. Though the 
above discussion is far from a satisfactory 
explanation of how Sengoku Japan operated and 
ultimately reunified, it points the way forward for 
how mechanisms drawn from disparate IR theories 
can be employed in the construction of contextualized 
explanations for a variety of episodes. 
 
 
 
The Challenge of East Asia for International 
Relations Theories 
By David C. Kang, University of Southern 
California 
 
Can International Relations theories be applied across 
time and space? Are some theories more time- or 
space-bound than others? It might seem intuitively 
obvious that different regions of the world, with 
vastly different religions, social structures, cultures, 
political systems, economic systems, and geography, 
would have different historical patterns of foreign 
relations, as well. Yet this seemingly obvious point is 
often masked by the confident assertion inherent in 
many conventional IR theories developed from the 
European experience that they are in fact deductive 
and universal. Yet perhaps a little more humility is in 
order, and more attention to the scope and boundary 
conditions for when a theory applies would be a 
positive step forward. As an example, in this short 
essay I will sketch the problems with applying power 
                                                 
13 Berry, Hideyoshi, 209-213. 
14 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal 
Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement 
of the European Union”, International Organization 55 
no. 1 (2001): 47-80. 
transition theory outside of the European experience 
in which the theory was originally formed. 
 
There is a view that power transitions between a 
rising power and a declining hegemon are particularly 
volatile, and that a war between China and the U.S. 
could be possible or even likely as a power transition 
draws near. Scholars and policymakers are 
increasingly worried about such a possibility. The 
application of power transition theory to 
contemporary Asia relies heavily on the analogy of a 
few key historical cases. For example, Susan Shirk 
argues, “History teaches us that rising powers are 
likely to provoke war. The ancient historian 
Thucydides identified the fear that a rising Athens 
inspired in other states as the cause of the 
Peloponnesian War.”1   
 
But what historical record is Shirk referring to? By 
far, the most commonly examined case studies of 
power transition in the scholarly literature are the 
Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) and the rise of 
Germany under Bismarck and Anglo-German rivalry 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries.2 In fact, although 
15 Lee Butler, Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan, 1467-
1680: Resilience and Renewal (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2002), 4. 
1 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 4. 
2 This essay draws on David Kang and Xinru Ma, 
“Domestic Threats, Selection Bias, and East Asian Power 
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power transition theory has become a widely-
accepted research program, the overwhelming 
majority of empirical cases examined in the literature 
are from the European historical experience, while 
scholars have paid almost no attention to the fairly 
clear methodological problems in case selection of 
power transition theory. From the time of Organski 
and Kugler onwards, almost all cases are drawn from 
1816-1975, and by far the two most studied cases are 
Anglo-German rivalry or the Peloponnesian War. It 
is troubling that the empirical cases that IR scholars 
use to derive their theories are essentially all 
European.  
 
After all, the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties are all 
potential examples of power transitions, not to 
mention those in Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and 
elsewhere. What scholars have not yet directly 
addressed is whether there are other power transitions 
in history, and whether power transition theory itself 
can be transposed outside of the European 
experience.  There is no scholarship that actually asks 
whether all other regions of the world fall inside of 
the scope and boundary conditions for the theory to 
apply. 
 
It could be that mainstream IR scholars have actually 
included all of the relevant empirical cases of power 
transition in their research, and in fact there was not 
one single case of a power transition in Asia. Indeed, 
it appears that for most of East Asian history, the 
conditions for power transition theory actually did not 
obtain, despite the rise and fall of Chinese, Korean, 
Vietnamese, Cham, Siamese, and Japanese power 
over time.   
 
The best way to study the contemporary international 
system is to compare it to something truly different. 
                                                 
Transitions in History” (Unpublished Manuscript, in the 
author’s possession, January 2018). 
3 See the discussion in Indra de Soysa, John Oneal, and 
Yong-Hee Park, “Testing Power-Transition Theory Using 
Because of the triumph of the nation-state system, it 
is forgotten that other international orders have 
existed, and might exist again. The current 
international system is actually a recent phenomenon 
in the scope of world history, but to date it has 
generally been studied from within: that is, scholars 
studied European history to explain how this 
European model for international relations developed 
over time.  
 
Although many scholars have extended and refined 
the theory, Organski and Kugler’s early definitions of 
a power transition war remains the simplest and most 
intuitive.3 Organski in 1968 examined hegemons and 
challengers; in 1980 Organski and Kugler refined the 
theory, arguing that a power transition war occurs if 
three scope conditions are met: 
 
1. At least one major power is involved on 
either side of the conflict 
2. The losing side loses territory or 
population 
3. Battle deaths reach higher than any 
previous war 
 
Yet even a cursory glance at East Asian history would 
reveal that the conditions Organski and Kugler 
identified have almost never been obtained by 
countries in East Asian history. Although Chinese 
power waxed and waned over the centuries, “China 
among equals” was a rare occurrence (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. European and East Asian share of world 
GDP, 1000-1820 
 China  Western 
Europe 
Japan  
1000 22.68 6.90 2.63 
1500 24.89 15.47 3.10 
1600 28.98 17.11 2.90 
1700 22.31 19.05 4.15 
1820 32.96 20.39 2.99 
Western Europe = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK (12 W. Europe) 
Source: The Maddison Project (2013) 
 
 
Rather, the biggest problem facing this type of 
replication study is that the form of political regime, 
their survival, and transition in East Asia differed 
from that experienced in Europe. Perhaps most 
Alternative Measures of National Capabilities,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 4 (1997): 509-528. 
“Researching historical East Asia 
provides an opportunity to seek out 
genuine comparisons of 
international system systems and 
their foundational components.  
 
“East Asia’s history was nothing 
like the European experience.” 
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importantly, the four most long-enduring countries in 
the region – China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam – were 
characterized by political regimes that have been 
called “dynasties.” These dynasties were remarkably 
long-enduring, and while there were occasional wars 
between these regimes, much of the violence was 
internal, not external. Most strikingly, only 3 out of 
20 regime transitions in China, Vietnam, Korea, and 
Japan from 500 CE to 1900 CE came as a result of 
war. The three external transitions were the 
Tang/Silla alliance that crushed Koguryo in 668, the 
Mongol conquest of both Song dynasties in 1274-79, 
and the Ming intervention in Vietnam in 1407 on 
behalf of the Tran dynasty against the Ho.  
 
Moreover, the Mongol and Manchu conquests of 
China did not occur in classic power transition 
fashion. The Mongols did attack the northern Song; 
but the Manchus did not advance on Beijing until the 
Ming had collapsed from internal rebellions, which 
were unrelated to any external attack. Indeed, it 
appears that internal instability was far more 
dangerous for these dynasties over the centuries than 
was external challenge. Exploring why this is so for 
such a large swath of the world can provide a much 
more nuanced way to study what are the scope and 
boundary conditions for when power transition theory 
applies.  
 
In this way, researching historical East Asia provides 
an opportunity to seek out genuine comparisons of 
international system systems and their foundational 
components. East Asia’s history was nothing like the 
European experience. East Asia historically was 
characterized by hegemony – a powerful, culturally 
influential China – as opposed to the routine 
bellicosity of balance of power Europe. Had our IR 
theories been derived from the Asian experience, it is 
almost impossible to imagine that we would have 
concluded that balance of power is a natural and 
inevitable phenomenon. As far back as the rise of 
unified Han dynasty in 221 BCE, Asia’s predominant 
pattern has been concentrated power, not balance of 
power. China rose and fell over the centuries, for sure, 
but the concentration of power in East Asia provides 
a stark contrast to the fragmentation of the European 
experience. 
 
Power transition theory is difficult to apply to 
premodern East Asia. The theory may be “right” or 
“wrong,” but it does not apply in a vast geographic 
region over a remarkably long period. That in itself 
should lead us to ask why this is the case – especially 
because power transition theory is largely considered 
to be a deductive and universal theory with a logic 
that is intuitive and self-evident. Perhaps more of our 
theories are more specific and contingent than is 
commonly believed, and if so, carefully identifying 
those scope and boundary conditions will be critical 
moving forward. Given the dramatically different 
context from Europe within which political regimes 
rose and fell in East Asian history, it is also perhaps 
worth being more cautious about applying the 
“lessons of history” to contemporary East Asian 
security dynamics. 
 
 
 
UCU Strike for USS 
Editors’ Note 
 
This roundtable was slated into include a contribution 
from Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Head of Politics and 
International Relations at Cardiff University and one 
of the discipline’s foremost experts on postcolonial 
International Relations theory and African politics. 
 
Due to the recent strike action in the UK, which has 
been organized by the University and College Union 
(UCU) in response to proposed cuts to university staff 
pensions, Professor Gruffydd Jones was, quite 
understandably, unable to complete her intended 
contribution. We wish her and all of our colleagues in 
the UK good luck, and hope for a fair settlement that 
protections their pensions and other rights. 
 
At time of writing, more strikes are planned for April 
2018. Information on the strike action, and 
instructions on how to contribute to the UCU’s 
fighting fund, can be found at the following link: 
 
https://www.ucu.org.uk/strikeforuss 
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Q&A: The 2017 IHAP 
Award Winners 
 
Each year, the IHAP section awards the Robert L. 
Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award 
and the Outstanding Article Award in 
International History and Politics. In 2017, the 
winners of these awards were Rosella Cappella 
Zielinski (for her book, How States Pay for Wars) 
and Lisa Blaydes and Christopher Paik (for their 
article, “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State 
Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and 
Political Development in Medieval Europe” in 
International Organization 70, no. 3). 
The IHAP newsletter team interviewed the award 
winners. What follows are their responses. 
Book award winner: Rosella Cappella 
Zielinski (Boston University): How States Pay for 
Wars (Cornell University Press, 2016) 
 
How did you become interested in the intersection 
between international history and politics? How 
did you become interested in the financing of war? 
 
Rosella: I did not anticipate going down the route of 
international history and politics. When I entered 
graduate school I planned on working in the realm of 
international political economy using quantitative 
methods. Things started to change while I was 
working on my dissertation. I realized that a) I 
enjoyed really big questions that spanned both time 
and space and b) via attending the Summer Workshop 
on the Analysis of Military Operations (SWAMOS), 
I came to appreciate the historical manner in which 
strategic studies scholars approached their research 
questions. Yet, I wanted to continue working on 
questions from a political economy angle. The works 
that I felt melded the two approaches best were those 
that addressed war and state building. Inspired by 
such works as Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital and 
European States, A.D. 990-1992 and Thomas 
Ertman’s Building Leviathan: Building States and 
Regime in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, I 
turned to war finance.  
 
What tips would you give graduate students or 
junior scholars interested in historical methods? 
 
Rosella: Go straight to the documents and visit an 
archive. I cannot tell you how much I get out of my 
archival visits. While always initially daunting, you 
find so much more than you imagined by going. 
Moreover, some of my best findings have been non-
findings, when you are certain there will be evidence 
for your argument but there is not. Only going to the 
archive yourself can provide you such information. 
More importantly, enjoy the archives. There is 
nothing better than looking at documents, especially 
those that have never been opened and you are 
surprised you are allowed to handle them. One of my 
favorite moments was when I was at the National 
Archives at Kew looking at the original handwritten 
Boer War cost accounting ledger that had not been 
checked out before. Finally, go as much as you can. 
Once you become a junior faculty member, time is 
limited and archival research travel is harder to do.  
 
Are there any scholars that you look to as role 
models? Or pieces of scholarship that you view as 
being templates for excellent research?  
 
Rosella: There are so many I hate to choose just a 
few! At the top of my list would be Robert Gilpin’s 
War and Change in World Politics. From the first 
time I read it to each time I teach it, I am continually 
impressed with the boldness of this work in regards 
to the question he asks, the parsimony of the answer 
he posits, and the breadth of time he addresses. 
Second on my list would be Daniel Carpenter’s The 
Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, 
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive 
Agencies, 1862-1928. His case study on the United 
States Postal Service still resonates with me today. He 
did an excellent job taking something seemingly 
esoteric and presenting a well-researched, 
informative, and compelling narrative of bureaucratic 
evolution. Third on my list would be a two-way tie 
between Adam Tooze’s Wages of Destruction: The 
Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy and 
Richard Bensel’s Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of 
Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877. Both 
works are excellent examples of historical pieces that 
address the means, causes, and consequences of war 
finance. 
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My peers doing excellent historical work also inspire 
me. My co-author Ryan Grauer, at the University of 
Pittsburgh, for example, has spent countless hours in 
various national and military archives looking to 
understand how military organization affects 
performance on the battlefield. My dear friend 
Barbara Elias at Bowdoin College, formally at the 
National Security Archives, has built an impressive 
database of documents accounting for the interaction 
of co-belligerents fighting counterinsurgencies.  
 
How do you navigate the tension between detailed 
historical research and macro theoretical claims; 
between contingency and generalizability?  
 
Rosella: Before I answer this question I lament that 
such a tension exists within the discipline of political 
science. Perhaps I am optimistic or naïve, but I think 
it is a false dichotomy as you can have macro 
theoretical claims supported by detailed historical 
research. The ability to do so, however, is no easy task 
for the author. In my case, the creation of a broad 
theoretical framework to understand war finance and 
account for war finance variation was paramount. 
However, to convince others I had to wage a multi-
method defense in depth. In addition to six case 
studies, which included visits to multiple archives, I 
created a dataset capturing how interstate wars have 
been financed since 1800.   
 
What was the most challenging aspect of working 
with the historical material used in your book 
project?  
 
Rosella: In retrospect, I think the most challenging 
aspect of working with historical material was word 
count. I only put a fraction of the evidence I collected 
into the book.  
 
The other challenge was time. While visiting archives 
is time consuming, the real challenge is sorting and 
cataloging your findings. For example, I took almost 
a thousand pictures at the Harry S. Truman 
Presidential Library alone. Creating a system to 
catalog findings and to do so in such a manner that 
was searchable took weeks. It is critical, however, to 
annotate all documents because you will return to 
them years later. I was grateful for taking the time 
when I was going through my copy edits for the book 
and found some quotes had missing citations.  
 
What was the most unexpected thing you found in 
conducting your historical research?  
 
Rosella: The most unexpected finding was limits of 
monetary policy – the tools central banks use to 
influence the amount and price of money in a state’s 
economy – as a means to control war inflation, 
particularly in the United States experience since 
World War I. In light of works touting Central Bank 
independence and personally being influenced by the 
anti-inflation regime of the Paul Volcker era, I 
wrongly assumed the Federal Reserve would 
privilege anti-inflationary policies during wartime. 
The opposite was true. I found that in multiple wars 
the Fed was unwilling and or unable to raise interest 
rates to ward off inflation. Instead, the Fed privileged 
cheap war debt to keep the costs of war down by 
pegging interest rates to low levels. More 
importantly, the chairperson of the Federal Reserve 
knowing the limits of monetary polity to control 
prices often encouraged the president to raise taxes 
not to pay for the war but as an anti-inflation measure.  
 
What would you like to see more of in terms of 
research into international history and politics, 
either methodologically or substantively? 
 
Rosella: I would like to see more work (and jobs) in 
the fields of American Political Development and 
Economic History. I get the impression that both are 
disappearing subfields. The works by Stephen 
Skowronek and Ira Katznelson, in the field of 
American Political Development for example, and 
Benjamin Cohen, in the field of economic history, are 
critical to understanding how the institutions that 
shape our political environment today came to be.  
 
What do you think are the biggest lessons that 
publics and/or governments should take from 
your work? 
 
Rosella: Raise taxes to pay for war. In addition to 
avoiding deficit spending, a progressive war tax 
mitigates inflation and decreases inequality through 
the redistribution of wealth. For example, during the 
Korean War, Truman felt the Roosevelt 
Administration did not raise taxes enough. Secretary 
of the Treasury John Snyder stated, “Unless prompt 
action is taken to increase taxes, we will be repeating 
the pattern of World War II financing which resulted 
in a permanent increase in the public debt. The 
President has properly said that we must not make this 
mistake again.” President Truman’s aggressive tax 
increase stabilized rising prices and yielded a budget 
surplus in 1951 and raised enough revenue to reduce 
gross federal debt that fiscal year. In contrast, during 
the Vietnam War, President Johnson and his advisors 
explicitly rejected the lessons from the previous war 
with Chairperson of the Council of Economic 
Advisors stating, “The analogy with Korea simply 
does not hold water” and war inflation was unlikely. 
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In turn, President Johnson proclaimed that the United 
States was a “rich nation” that could “afford to make 
progress at home while meeting obligations abroad.” 
He explained, that it was for “this reason, [he had] not 
halted progress in the new and vital Great Society 
programs in order to finance the costs of our efforts 
in Southeast Asia.” 
  
While contemporary leaders are deterred from raising 
taxes to avoid political costs - the Bush and Obama 
Administrations implemented multiple tax cuts 
during the Wars of Iraq and Afghanistan – they 
should consider the statement made by President 
Johnson’s advisor McGeorge Bundy to the president 
in March 1968,  “I now understand, as I did not when 
I got here, that the really tough problem you have is 
the interlock between the bad turn in the war, the 
critical need for a tax increase, and the crisis of public 
confidence at home. If I understand the immediate 
needs correctly, the most important of all may be the 
tax increase, simply because without it both the dollar 
and the economy could come apart—and with them 
everything else.” 
 
 
 
 
Article award winners: Lisa Blaydes (Stanford 
University, blaydes@stanford.edu) and 
Christopher Paik (NYU Abu Dhabi, 
christopher.paik@nyu.edu): “The Impact of Holy 
Land Crusades on State Formation: War 
Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political 
Development in Medieval Europe,” International 
Organization 70, no. 3 (2016): 551-586 
 
 
 
 
 
How did you become interested in the intersection 
between international history and politics? How 
did you become interested in war mobilization and 
state formation? 
 
CP: History provides us with valuable insights and 
lessons on understanding political processes. I always 
find myself drawn to past events that come at critical 
moments and have lasting impact. They offer clues to 
where we first start seeing political and economic 
divergence. I was initially looking at the Neolithic 
Revolution in effort to trace the first rise of state 
formation, and eventually found myself connecting 
my research endeavor with related topics in more 
recent history, on war mobilization and state 
formation in Europe. 
 
LB: I first became interested in the study of history as 
an undergraduate when I took a 4-semester sequence 
in the History of Occidental Civilization.  Yet as 
foundational as that course work was for me, labeling 
the history of the Western world as the study of 
"Occidental Civilization" draws an immediate, 
implicit contrast with the streams of history left 
untaught.  The "Occident-Orient" characterization 
belies the interconnected, highly dependent nature of 
cross-cultural interactions, a point that we try to make 
in our paper.  Cross-cultural conflict provides one 
way by which these interactions take place but, of 
course, economic ties, environmental interconnetions 
and disease exchange are other avenues of connection 
across regions.   
 
What tips would you give graduate students or 
junior scholars interested in historical methods? 
 
LB: I would encourage students and junior scholars 
to read broadly and pursue opportunities for 
interdisciplinary engagement, whenever 
possible.  Humanists are increasingly intrigued by the 
opportunities presented by growth of the Digital 
Humanities.  Within the field of economics, 
economic history has also enjoyed a higher profile in 
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recent years.  Political Science students and scholars 
have the potential to play an important role in 
bridging these interdisciplinary conversations as 
humanists see the opportunities presented by 
developments in data science and economists engage 
with the core questions of historical economic 
development.   
 
CP: It is an exciting field with no shortage of topics 
to explore, since it is interdisciplinary in nature and 
speaks to scholars not only in history and political 
science, but also economics and sociology. But this 
also means having to frame the topics with the right 
motivating questions and convincing scholars in 
various fields, which are always challenging. I would 
still encourage people to look for regions and events 
in history that have not been explored- either in 
political science, history, or either. Holy Land 
Crusades are written about and deemed an important 
topic among medieval history scholars, but we have 
not seen much work with empirical analysis of their 
impact in the literature.  
  
What do you think are the major differences in 
how political scientists and historians “do” 
history? 
 
CP I would think that political scientists tend to focus 
on macro theories and generalizable implications, for 
which history often provides apt context and testing 
ground. For historians, the priority may be in 
understanding the significance of particular moment 
and place in depth, and their scope of analysis defined 
in a narrower and more focused frame.  
 
Are there any scholars that you look to as role 
models? Or pieces of scholarship that you view as 
being templates for excellent research? 
 
LB: David Stasavage, Timur Kuran, Romain 
Wacziarg, James Fearon and James Kung are some of 
the senior colleagues working on comparative 
political economy, economic history and long-run 
growth and institutions. I have looked up to their 
works when formulating my research ideas. 
 
CP: Janet Abu-Lughod's Before European 
Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 
stands out in my mind as an example of outstanding, 
engaging scholarship.  Patricia Crone's writing and 
research has also had an important influence on my 
work.   
 
How do you navigate the tension between detailed 
historical research and macro theoretical claims; 
between contingency and generalizability?  
 
CP: This tension makes the writing process more 
difficult in a fruitful way. In some ways it is 
inevitable, as research methodologies differ across 
disciplines. I appreciate constructive criticism from 
scholars in other fields, but also try to convince them 
the value added in pursuing empirical research 
embedded in historical context, and proposing 
testable claims that can then be either refuted or 
supported with data. 
 
LB: This is a very difficult issue.  Within a single 
paper, I think that it can be quite challenging to 
balance these concerns.  My feeling is that close 
attention should be paid to historical detail with 
regard to causal mechanism.  Social scientists tend to 
be most highly concerned with the processes or 
pathways by which political change 
occurs.  Historians are typically much better at 
providing a detailed account of the state of the world.  
 
What do you think are the biggest lessons that 
publics and/or governments should take from 
your work? 
 
CP: That history matters! This goes for any works on 
exploring the legacies and long-run impact of past 
events. The crusades happened a long time ago, but 
their impact on trade, urbanization and political 
development help to explain the subsequent series of 
events that unfolded in Europe. Factors involved in 
the proposed mechanism, including religious fervor 
and perceived external threat, taxation, trade 
integration and ruler stability all continue to be 
relevant today, as they were centuries ago. 
 
It seems hard for governments and democratic 
publics to learn from history. What do you think 
we could do differently to communicate 
international historical research to “real world” 
actors? 
 
CP: Policy makers and academics are often at odds on 
what should be done on the ground. We are trained to 
provide positive analyses, while normative 
implications and policy suggestions are perhaps often 
set aside from our priorities. One way to engage a 
broader audience might be by providing more 
guidance for the general reader on the relevance of the 
topic at hand with regard to current events. This may 
involve extending relevant discussions on our papers, 
writing op-eds specifically on the importance of 
historical research on understanding deep-rooted 
government and public issues, and training students 
to appreciate historical research in similar regard. 
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The data collected for use in your article 
impressed a lot of people. What was the most 
challenging aspect of working with the historical 
material used in your article?  
 
LB: We tried to be exhaustive in our collection of 
crusader mobilization as well as other key 
explanatory variables, like the location of medieval 
cathedrals.  What was more difficult, in my opinion, 
was operationalizing development of the state, our 
outcome variable.  This led us to try a number of 
different strategies.  
 
CP: We had different waves of crusader mobilization 
and changing state borders over time, so a main data 
challenge was using the information collected and 
actually deciding on the proper unit of analysis for our 
empirical study.  
 
What was the most unexpected thing you found in 
conducting your historical research?  
 
CP: How much impact the crusaders actually had on 
subsequent political development, urbanization and 
trade, and their long-term implications. Our initial 
motivation was to simply try to understand the role of 
the crusaders and their place in history, in between the 
spread of feudalism and the rise of modern sovereign 
states in Europe. We were pleasantly surprised by the 
various significant results that we tested for.  
 
LB: I would like to see a greater focus and interest in 
understanding the history and politics of world 
regions outside of Europe.   
 
What would you like to see more of in terms of 
research into international history and politics, 
either methodologically or substantively? 
 
CP: I am encouraged to see that both general political 
science and economics journals are publishing topics 
on international history with advanced research 
methods. Substantively, I would like to see more 
research done on Central Asia, Southeast Asia and 
East Asia excluding China. These regions offer rich 
contextual insight, and in many cases, wealth of data 
ready to be explored. There are yet many works to be 
done. One is to re-test the various hypotheses 
forwarded in the literature hitherto based on the 
European and North American context, and to see 
whether these claims can be generalized under 
different geographic settings (ex. warfare and state 
formation in Europe vs. Asia). Another is to explore 
the unique context that these regions offer and 
propose alternative theories (ex. Asian tributary state 
systems compared to Western territorial state 
systems, Japanese colonization and its impact on 
former colonial states). Yet another is to work on the 
various topics that connect these different regions 
(inter-regional trade and political fragmentation of 
empires, for example).  
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Upcoming Events and Workshops 
 
 
April 2018 
 
76th Annual Midwest Political Science Association  
April 5-8, Chicago IL, USA 
More information 
 
ECPR 2018 Joint Sessions of Workshops 
April 10-15, Nicosia, Cyprus 
More information 
 
New England Political Science Association Annual 
Meeting 
April 19-21, Portsmouth NH, USA 
More information 
 
June 2018 
 
Midwest Public Affairs Conference  
June 6-8, Chicago IL, USA 
More information 
 
5th Annual European Workshops in International 
Studies 
June 6-9, Groningen, Netherlands 
More information 
 
Measuring Leadership Conference 
June 12-13, Warsaw, Poland  
More information  
 
Research Workshops in International Studies 
(RWIS) 
June 12, Bath, UK 
More information 
 
43rd British International Studies Association 
Annual Conference 
June 13-15, Bath, UK 
More information 
 
Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American Studies 
[SPLAS] Postgraduate Community Forum —  
June 22-23, University of Nottingham, UK 
More information 
  
Development Economics and Policy 
June 28-29, Zürich, Switzerland 
More information  
 
July 2018 
 
Pluralism(s) in Emergencies: Movement, Space, and 
Religious Difference 
July 11-12, Tunis, Tunisia 
More information  
 
FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference 
July 25-27, Quito, Ecuador 
More information 
 
ECPR Summer School in Methods and Techniques 
July 26-August 10, Budapest, Hungary 
More information 
 
August 2018 
 
Asia and the Anthropocene Workshop 
August 23-27, Ann Arbor MI, USA 
More information  
 
114th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition 
August 30 - September 2, Boston MA, USA 
More information 
 
September 2018 
 
ISA West Annual Conference 
September 21-22, Pasadena CA, USA 
More information 
 
October 2018 
 
ISA South Annual Conference 
October 12-13, Ashland VA, USA 
More information 
 
November 2018 
 
The Second International Conference on Well-being 
November 1-2, Singapore University of Social 
Sciences, Singapore 
More information 
 
ISA Northeast Annual Conference 
November 2-3, Baltimore MD, USA 
More information 
 
ISA Midwest Annual Conference 
November 16-17, St. Louis MO, USA 
More information 
 
The Ethics of Business, Trade & Global Governance 
An Interdisciplinary Conference 
November 30 – December 1, New Castle NH, USA 
More information 
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March 2019 
 
60th International Studies Association Annual 
Convention 
March 27-30, Toronto ON, Canada 
More information 
 
June 2019 
 
44th British International Studies Association Annual 
Meeting 
June 12-14, London, UK 
More information 
 
August 2019 
 
115th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition 
August 29 – September 1, Washington DC, USA 
More information 
